Rebalancing Rhode Island’s Balance Sheet by Khamsyvoravong, Xaykham R.
Roger Williams University Law Review
Volume 24 | Issue 2 Article 7
Spring 2019
Rebalancing Rhode Island’s Balance Sheet
Xaykham R. Khamsyvoravong
J.D. Candidate 2020, Roger Williams University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.rwu.edu/rwu_LR
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DOCS@RWU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Roger Williams University Law Review by an authorized editor of DOCS@RWU. For more information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Khamsyvoravong, Xaykham R. (2019) "Rebalancing Rhode Island’s Balance Sheet," Roger Williams University Law Review: Vol. 24 :






Rebalancing Rhode Island’s Balance 
Sheet 
Xaykham Rexford Khamsyvoravong* 
INTRODUCTION 
Rhode Island policymakers should consider an accounting 
mechanism that could materially alleviate the pension-funding 
crisis: Asset In-Kind Contributions (Asset Transfers)—the transfer 
of municipal assets to municipal pension funds.  Asset Transfers 
have the potential to help rebalance municipal balance sheets by 
allowing municipal pension funds to account for the value of 
municipal assets, while maintaining public oversight of critical 
public infrastructure.  This Comment explores whether some of 
Rhode Island’s largest and most underfunded municipal pension 
funds have the governance structures necessary to make Asset 
Transfers a viable tool to improve pension funding. 
While this Comment considers Asset Transfers as a viable tool 
for multiple Rhode Island municipalities, its most obvious 
application is to alleviate the billion dollar pension liability faced 
by the City of Providence.1  If the Providence Water Supply Board 
were to be transferred from the city’s balance sheet to that of the 
city’s pension fund, it could offset a liability equal to its appraised 
valuation—estimated to be $400 million—improving the pension’s 
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funding level from its current level, 26.3%, to over 50%.2  Such a 
transfer has the potential to position the fund to negotiate 
meaningful reforms, but it is not, in and of itself, a silver bullet to 
the pension fund’s cash flow challenges.  However, an Asset 
Transfer would allow the city to use the value of the Providence 
Water Supply Board to help offset its largest liability while 
ensuring that the utility remains under public control, 
guaranteeing that any future increase in its value accrues back to 
the taxpayers rather than to a private third party. 
Providence is not alone.  Many of Rhode Island’s cities and 
towns are on the brink of bankruptcy, driven to this precipice by the 
economy and politics.3  The most burdensome of these pressures are 
the massive and growing financial liabilities created by a failure to 
properly fund the pensions promised to public employees.4  
Government accounting standards have continuously evolved over 
the past decade in an effort to highlight and quantify this burden.5  
While these standards now guide government to better reflect its 
liabilities, government has yet to maximize the accounting value of 
its assets.  Asset Transfers should be considered as a tool to help 
municipalities leverage the value of their assets to improve the 
 
 2. John Hill, Providence Is Hoping the Scituate Reservoir Can Save Its 
Economy, PROVIDENCE J. (June 4, 2018), https://www.providencejournal.
com/news/20180601/providence-is-hoping-scituate-reservoir-can-save-its-
economy [https://perma.cc/W4EQ-4HPP]. 
 3. See Randal Edgar, My Turn: Randal Edgar: Rhode Island’s Other 
Pension Problem, PROVIDENCE J. (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.
providencejournal.com/opinion/20180214/my-turn-randal-edgar-rhode-
islands-other-pension-problem?template=ampart [https://perma.cc/Y67L-
HT3Y].  See also Economic Tsunami: Data Shows RI Cities & Towns Are 
Facing Peril Due to Unfunded Obligation, GOLOCALPROV (Mar. 12, 2019), 
https://www.golocalprov.com/news/economic-tsunami-data-shows-ri-cities-
towns-are-facing-peril-due-to-unfunde [https://perma.cc/G3B6-VXD2] 
[hereinafter Economic Tsunami].  
 4. See Economic Tsunami, supra note 3.  
 5. See GOV’T ACCT. STANDARDS BD., NEW GASB PENSION STATEMENTS TO 






&blobtable=MungoBlobs [https://perma.cc/B5RX-LG6J]; Ted Nesi, Study: 
Plans in ‘Critical’ Condition for 17 RI Cities, Towns, WPRI (May 8, 2018, 8:55 
PM), https://www.wpri.com/politics/study-pension-plans-in-critical-condition-
for-17-ri-cities-towns/1167190242 [https://perma.cc/VK3U-YFNG]. 
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funding levels of municipal pension funds. 
Policymakers, both in Rhode Island and nationally, typically 
chip away at budget challenges by pulling the traditional financial 
levers of government: raise revenue (taxes) or cut costs (services, 
infrastructure, pensions).6  In the decade since the financial crisis, 
a climate of austerity has dominated public budget decisions, 
stunting lawmakers’ willingness to enact additional taxes to raise 
revenues.7  Complicating matters further, relatively stagnant 
revenue growth has left government unable to keep pace with 
inflation, forcing policymakers to focus on whom to cut, rather than 
in what to invest.8  Eventually global events, like the Great 
Recession, exacerbate this dilemma, and bankruptcy proceedings 
replace budget negotiations, as evidenced by such proceedings in 
Detroit, Michigan, and Central Falls, Rhode Island.9 
As that turning point is reached, public officials, in an effort to 
maintain control rather than ceding it to the courts, often revert to 
extreme measures, including the sale or long-term leasing of 
assets—despite the absence of provisions allowing courts to force 
liquidation of essential service assets in a chapter nine municipal 
bankruptcy.10  Every year municipalities enter into billions of 
dollars of long-term leases or sales of their assets—water and 
wastewater systems, bridges, toll roads, museum and art 
collections, airports, lottery systems, even streetlights.11  Rising to 
 
 6. Paul Burton, How In-Kind Asset Contributions Could Ease 
Connecticut’s Pension Funding Woes, BOND BUYER (Sept. 11, 2018, 11:07 AM), 
https://www.bondbuyer.com/news/connecticut-mulls-in-kind-asset-
contributions-for-pensions [https://perma.cc/9X5T-ZWSN].   
 7. Max Ehrenfreund, U.S. Austerity Was Even Worse than We Thought, 




 8. Hilary Russ, Bankruptcy Saves Tiny Rhode Island City, but Leaves 
Scars, REUTERS (Sept. 3, 2012, 8:10 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
usa-rhodeisland-centralfalls-bankrupt-idUSBRE88300220120904 
[https://perma.cc/5DN6-MM4C]. 
 9. Id.; Jenna Carlesso, Detroit, Central Falls Leaders Share Pitfalls, 
Advantages of Bankruptcy, COURANT COMMUNITY (Oct. 17, 2017, 10:00 AM), 
https://www.courant.com/community/hartford/hc-news-hartford-bankruptcy-
panels-20171017-story-html [https://perma.cc/633T-RXD5].  
 10. Kristen M. Dejong & Beth A. Dougherty, Municipal Bankruptcy: A 
Primer on Chapter 9, NUVEEN (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.nuveen.com/
municipal-bankruptcy-a-primer-on-chapter-9 [https://perma.cc/4PH8-CBNQ]. 
 11. The Promise and Pitfalls of Privatizing Public Assets, ECONOMIST (June 
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this opportunity, Wall Street has proven adept at connecting cash-
strapped municipalities with investors seeking the stable returns 
generated by municipal assets.12  Ironically, the one investor 
largely absent from the domestic infrastructure market is the one 
most in need of a stable return: municipal public pension funds. 
The absence of public pension funds as investors in the 
domestic infrastructure market is likely due to a combination of the 
lack of readily available infrastructure investment opportunities 
and an unwillingness to veer from public pension funds’ traditional 
investment strategies.  A typical public pension fund seeks an 
annual investment return of seven to nine percent, by investing in 
a combination of fixed income, equities, and alternative assets like 
real estate and private equity.13  Despite this targeted return and 
asset mix, pension funds often fall short: of the top thirty-four 
municipal pension funds in Rhode Island, only one averaged 
returns over ten years in excess of its investment target for Fiscal 
Year 2016.14  This shortfall forces funds to reach for higher returns 
through riskier investments—a strategy with a clear downside.  
Infrastructure offers a relatively stable and reliable alternative to 
these other asset classes.  While this Comment focuses on the 
immediate funding, governance, and tax benefits of Asset 
Transfers, the match between typical returns on infrastructure 
investments and the returns targeted by pension funds is 
compelling and should not be overlooked. 
This Comment contains four parts.  Part I provides an overview 
of the pension crisis facing many of Rhode Island’s largest 
municipalities.  Part II explains Asset Transfers and provides 
examples of their historic use by private corporations and their 
emerging use by government.  Part III focuses on the key financial 




 12. Id. 
 13. Lisa Abramowicz, 5% is the New 8% for Pension Funds, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 2, 2017, 2:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/
articles/2017-08-02/5-is-the-new-8-for-reliable-returns-for-pension-funds 
[https://perma.cc/3VW6-96EK]. 
 14. See STATE OF R.I. OFFICE OF THE GEN. TREASURER, REPORT OF THE 
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continue to invest in capital improvements for the asset on a tax-
exempt basis.  Finally, Part IV addresses important public 
oversight and governance matters by considering the composition 
of the municipal boards that manage the pension assets of some of 
Rhode Island’s largest municipalities, and weighs whether the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is likely to consider them 
instrumentalities of government.  This final determination both 
ensures continued public oversight over critical infrastructure and 
preserves the tax exemption described in Part III. 
I. RHODE ISLAND’S MUNICIPAL PENSION CRISIS NEEDS TO BE 
ADDRESSED IMMEDIATELY 
A. Rhode Island’s Largest Municipal Pension Funds are on the 
Brink of Insolvency, and Municipal Leaders Have Limited 
Options to Guarantee Future Solvency 
Rhode Island’s municipal pension funds have an estimated 
collective unfunded liability of $2.5 billion—roughly $2,500 of 
liability for every resident of the state.15  However, this burden is 
not evenly distributed.  As of 2017, over a third of Rhode Island’s 
thirty-four cities and towns have critically underfunded pension 
plans.16  The metrics become even more concerning considering 
that the largest liabilities are from communities that form Rhode 
Island’s economic core: Providence, Pawtucket, Cranston, Warwick, 
Woonsocket, Central Falls, and the urban towns of West Warwick 
and Johnston.17 
The scale of the unfunded liability varies between these 
municipalities, but the dismal prognosis is consistent.  Leading the 
above group is the City of Providence, whose open employee plan is 
only 26.2% funded.18  The system is estimated to be underfunded 
by nearly one billion dollars, and experts have forecasted that, 
without major reform, this liability will place a debilitating burden 
on the city by 2026.19  Cynics consistently tout bankruptcy as the 
 
 15. See STATE OF R.I. OFFICE OF THE GEN. TREASURER, REPORT OF THE 
ADVISORY COUNCIL FOR LOCALLY ADMINISTERED PENSION PLANS 5 (Apr. 2019), 
https://d10k7k7mywg42z.cloudfront.net/assets/5cc74caa438fc35bcc11d181/LA
PP_Report_FINAL_4_29_19.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9KA-M3ZC] [hereinafter 
PENSION PLANS]. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 9, 21–22, 24–27, 29, 33–35, 44. 
 18. Id. at 20. 
 19. City of Providence Ten Year Plan: Summary of Key Benchmarking 
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remedy; however, reflecting on Rhode Island’s one example—the 
City of Central Falls’ restructuring in 2010—it is clear that such 
processes are not a panacea.  While the restructuring, combined 
with an energetic and forward-thinking mayor, helped Central 
Falls regain its financial footing, unfunded pension liabilities 
continue to plague the city: only $9.99 million remains in its 
employee pension fund, leaving it 26.5% funded.20  While this dollar 
figure is a fraction of the liability faced by Providence and other 
Rhode Island municipalities, Central Falls shows that the blunt 
cleaver of bankruptcy is not an end-all solution and that 
municipalities must consider all available financial tools.21 
B. While Cash Poor, Municipalities are Asset Rich 
The budget problems for many of Rhode Island’s municipalities 
are rooted in their underfunded pension funds: liabilities greatly 
exceed the available assets.22  This imbalance translates into cash 
flow problems when municipalities need to budget funds to make 
annual payments toward the unfunded liabilities.  Poor investment 
returns, skipped payments, and changes in life expectancy 
continuously drive these payments upward, exacerbating ongoing 
cash flow problems.  However, looking beyond the reported 
financials of government entities, municipalities are actually quite 
asset rich despite being cash poor.23  Consider public buildings, 
utilities, highways, golf courses, even street lights—government 
owns great assets whose values are not accounted for on the part of 
its financials where they are needed most to offset liabilities.  This 
would be like an individual, when determining their overall net 
worth, having to record the entirety of their projected retirement 
needs as a liability but not recording against it the value of her 
deeded share of the family beach house. 
Take, for example, a typical government’s most valuable 
assets: water and wastewater utilities.  Almost every single one of 
Rhode Island’s large municipalities with underfunded pension 
 
Findings, CITY OF PROVIDENCE, 3, 13 (Apr. 11, 2016), https://data.providenceri.
gov/Finance/City-of-Providence-Ten-Year-Plan-Summary-of-Key-Be/xiqd-
5udr [https://perma.cc/A9RG-K4R4]. 
 20. PENSION PLANS, supra note 15, at 9. 
 21. Russ, supra note 8. 
 22. See id. 
 23. See DAG DEETER & STEFAN FÖLSTER, THE PUBLIC WEALTH OF CITIES: 
HOW TO UNLOCK HIDDEN ASSETS TO BOOST GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 5–7 (2017). 
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funds also own and operate water or wastewater utilities.  These 
municipalities carry two burdens: they pay the ongoing costs of 
utility employees’ post-employment benefits (pensions and 
healthcare) and lose the property taxes from real estate occupied by 
these utilities.  Surrounding suburbs are often served by these 
utilities, and while their users pay regulated rates for consumption, 
the above expenses and tax breaks provided by the host 
municipality serve as an ongoing subsidy.24 
There is an accounting tool rooted in the basics of corporate 
finance that would allow municipalities to account for the value of 
these assets without surrendering public oversight and control: 
Asset Transfers. 
II. ASSET TRANSFERS ARE IMPORTANT AND EFFECTIVE TOOLS 
A. The Success of Asset Transfers in the Private and Public 
Sectors Proves They are an Effective Tool Rhode Island Should 
Consider Using 
 Asset Transfers move the ownership of a non-cash asset from a 
sponsoring entity to its pension fund.25  Unlike a monetization, 
where an asset is sold or leased to an outside entity in return for a 
cash payment, no cash is exchanged—ownership of the asset is 
simply transferred to the pension fund, and the fund receives a 
credit equal to the appraised value of the asset.  Unlike other 
monetization methods—i.e., a lease or sale—Asset Transfers keep 
control of the asset in the same corporate family, allowing the 
asset’s value to offset liabilities.  The transfer is analogous to one’s 
parents moving into a nursing home and signing over the title of 
the now empty house to their children—the parent is able to keep 
 
 24. The best example of this is the Providence Water Supply Board 
(Providence Water), which provides drinking water to sixty percent of Rhode 
Island.  Its facilities are exempt from Providence municipal taxes; its 
employees are city employees who accrue city pension benefits.  See Real Estate 
Tax Statement 125 Dupont Drive (Providence Water Central Operating 





 25. Michael Bennon et al., In-Kind Infrastructure Investments by Public 
Pensions: The Queensland Motorways Case Study, STAN. GLOBAL PROJECTS 
CTR. 1, 7 (June 5, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2981707 [https://perma.cc/
N895-VF6U]. 
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the home in the family, while allowing the children to realize the 
benefit of ownership. 
For decades, corporations have used Asset Transfers to 
leverage the value of their assets to improve the funding of their 
employees’ pension funds, while maintaining control of the asset 
within the same corporate family.26  For example, Pan American 
World Airways staved off bankruptcy by transferring its terminal 
leases at John F. Kennedy Airport to its employees’ pension fund; 
United States Steel Corporation contributed over a hundred 
thousand acres of timberland to its pension fund; and General 
Motors moved securities from the balance sheet of a subsidiary to 
its employees’ pension fund to improve its fiscal health.27  Because 
the asset is transferred rather than acquired with a cash payment, 
the financial benefit is multifold.  First, the value of the asset is 
immediately recordable against the unfunded pension liability.  
Second, any increase in revenues or operating efficiency generates 
a cash return for the fund rather than paying the debt service from 
the acquisition. 
In the case of a government Asset Transfer, there is the 
additional benefit of tax-exemption.  Because the transfer is a 
partnership between public entities, future investment in the asset 
and any revenue growth can likely remain tax-exempt so long as 
the entity is an instrumentality of government, as described further 
in Part III of this Comment. 
Consider, for example, the traditional monetization of a 
hypothetical water utility with an annual operating budget of $25 
million and assets and a customer base valued at $100 million.  Pre-
acquisition, consumer rates are set to cover the annual operating 
budget and requisite maintenance.  If the utility was acquired at 
the its assessed value, the purchaser would need to raise consumer 
rates or find efficiencies sufficient to cover both the $25 million in 
annual operational expenses and the debt payments for the $100 
million it borrowed to acquire the asset (or the return on equity 
expected by investors who provided the $100 million to acquire the 
asset).  In addition, there could be tax implications for what were 
previously non-taxable income and assets.  The result is that 
 
 26. Jill Eicher, Public Pensions and the Assets that Could Sustain Them, 
GOVERNING (Mar. 14, 2017), http://www.governing.com/gov-institute/voices/
col-public-pensions-transferred-assets-dedicated-funding.html 
[https://perma.cc/CYU5-LHHY]. 
 27. Id. 
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ratepayers would now be paying twice for the same service despite 
giving up control: the acquisition costs of the purchaser in addition 
to operational expenses. 
Conversely, if the asset were transferred from the 
municipality’s ledger to the pension fund using an Asset Transfer, 
the municipality could immediately record the asset’s valuation 
against its pension liability, and any future appreciation in value 
would accrue to the benefit of the pension fund, and ultimately, the 
municipality and its taxpayers.28  Thus, a government Asset 
Transfer offers the benefit of maximizing the accounting impact of 
the asset’s value, without the involvement of a third party who 
would need to derive a return on the system to, at minimum, pay 
for the acquisition. 
One of the biggest criticisms of monetizing municipal 
infrastructure is that it removes public oversight of critical public 
infrastructure.29  A key difference with an Asset Transfer is that 
many public pension funds are considered instrumentalities of 
government, thereby preserving public oversight.30  Keeping 
essential public assets under public control is good public policy, 
and pension funds have proven to be good managers of public 
assets.31  Importantly, while the public maintains governance 
oversight through pension boards, moving the asset out from under 
the direct umbrella of government affords management greater 
autonomy to pursue efficiencies, while also maintaining tax 
benefits.32  Such transfers align the interests of labor—maximizing 
the efficiency and value of an asset that helps fund their pensions—
and taxpayers who appoint the majority of the pension board 
managing the asset.33  The rise of public Asset Transfers in the past 
decade highlight these financial, governance, and political benefits, 
and are the focus of recent legislative initiatives.34 
 
 28. Bennon et al., supra note 25, at 16. 
 29. Elizabeth Douglass, Towns Sell Their Public Water Systems—and 





 30. See infra section IV. 
 31. Eicher, supra note 26. 
 32. See infra section III.A. 
 33. See Eicher, supra note 26. 
 34. See infra section II.A. 
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In 2011, the state government of Queensland, Australia, made 
an Asset Transfer of its toll-road network to its state pension 
fund.35  The initial transfer offset $3.8 billion Australian dollars of 
pension liabilities.  The pension fund’s management then made 
substantial investments to build out the infrastructure, which more 
than doubled its value in just three years.36  Rather than a private 
investor booking that return, the Queensland government’s 
pensioners received the benefit.37 
In the United States there have been several Asset Transfers.38  
In 2017 the New Jersey Legislature signed a “memorandum of 
contribution,” contributing the New Jersey Lottery to its pensions 
for a thirty-year term.39  The transfer offset nearly $13.5 billion 
dollars in pension liabilities, and the legislative action received 
resounding support from both of New Jersey’s legislative 
chambers.40  In 2010, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, irrevocably 
dedicated parking revenues to the city’s pension funds, contributing 
to an upgrade in the city’s credit rating by Fitch, a municipal credit 
ratings agency.41  The City of Hartford, Connecticut, as part of its 
efforts to address its fiscal woes, transferred ownership of a 600-
acre public park to its pension fund, and credited $5 million against 
its unfunded pension liability.42  While the public policy 
implications behind each of these Asset Transfers differ 
substantially—a cash generating lottery is admittedly much 
different than a public park—it is clear that models for domestic 
Asset Transfers are being formulated as the benefits become better 
known. 
Several states have initiatives focused on studying Asset 
Transfers.  On the heels of its lottery transfer, New Jersey’s 
 
 35. Eicher, supra note 26. 
 36. Bennon et al., supra note 25, at 16. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See Robert Steyer, New Jersey Approves Budget, Shifting State Lottery 




 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Eicher, supra note 26. 
 42. Marc E. Fitch, What Does a Pension Fund Do with a Park?, YANKEE 
INSTITUTE FOR PUB. POL’Y (Apr. 28, 2017), http://www.yankeeinstitute.org/
2017/04/what-does-a-pension-fund-do-with-a-park/ [https://perma.cc/K8SL-
V84D]. 
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Economic & Fiscal Policy Workgroup committed to “[d]evelop 
legislation to lay the framework for any future public asset 
transfer,” and has undertaken an effort to create an inventory of 
public assets suitable for such transfers.43  In Illinois, the Illinois 
Finance Authority, the state’s primary vehicle for infrastructure 
investment, is considering the creation of a trust to facilitate Asset 
Transfers.44  The State of Connecticut’s Pension Sustainability 
Commission is also discussing the establishment of a similar trust 
to manage Asset Transfers of municipal assets.45 
Before investing in a similar such inquiry, determining the 
potential governance and tax implications is an essential gating 
issue and is the focus of the balance of this Comment. 
 
III. TAX-EXEMPTION MAXIMIZES THE PROFITABILITY OF AN ASSET IN 
KIND CONTRIBUTION 
A. Asset Transfers Between Government Entities Can Allow the 
Asset to Remain Tax-Exempt, Which, In Turn, Maximizes an 
Asset’s Profitability and Minimizes the Cost of Future 
Operations and Maintenance 
It is crucial that the tax-exempt status of municipal assets be 
preserved through an Asset Transfer.  Tax-exemption ensures that 
both the ratepayer and the municipality enjoy a low cost of capital 
for operations, maintenance, and improvement.  To finance these 
capital improvements, municipal entities typically issue bonds, 
either backed by the municipalities’ general obligation promise to 
repay the lender from tax revenues or by a security interest in the 
revenues of income producing assets, like water utilities.46  The 
benefit of tax exemption is that lenders and investors who purchase 
 
 43. Leveraging Assets to Stabilize Pension System, PATH TO PROGRESS NJ, 
http://pathtoprogressnj.org/proposals/leveraging-assets-to-stabilize-pension-
system/ [https://perma.cc/9ZB8-L354] (last visited Mar. 9, 2019).   
 44. See ILL. FIN. AUTH., REGULAR MEETING OF THE MEMBERS, Feb. 8, 2018, 
https://www.il-fa.com/sites/default/files/board-documents/02-08-18-board-
minutes.pdf [https://perma.cc/8P53-JMQK]. 
 45. Burton, supra note 6.  The concept of creating a state-managed trust, 
which manages assets on behalf of municipal pension funds, offers great 
potential from the perspective of a fiduciary duty, and, considering the 
potential management of multiple similar entities under one umbrella—
regionalization.  Id. 
 46. NEIL O’HARA, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MUNICIPAL BONDS 1 (6th ed. 
2012). 
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these municipal bonds do not pay tax on the interest income they 
receive and are therefore willing to offer a lower interest rate to the 
borrower, resulting in a lower cost of funding for capital projects.47  
This lower cost of funding means that a publicly owned enterprise 
is able to borrow, build, and expand at a fraction of what it would 
cost a private entity.48 
Consider the following hypothetical to demonstrate this 
benefit.  A private water company and a public water utility each 
seek financing to build a mile of water mains in new neighborhoods 
at a cost of $1 million for each project.  Both entities go to the same 
lender seeking the $1 million, to be repaid in one year.  The lender 
needs to receive an average of 5% interest on the loans it makes and 
is in a 30% interest tax bracket.  This means the private company 
will borrow at a 5% interest rate.  However, the public entity will 
borrow from the same lender at a tax-exempt interest rate of 3.5% 
because public borrower’s interest payments will be tax-exempt 
income for the lender, saving the lender $15,000 in taxes it would 
have otherwise paid.  After one year, the private water company 
will end up paying $50,000 in interest, whereas the public water 
utility will pay only $35,000 in interest, allowing the municipality 
to operate and expand at a substantially lower cost.  This 
differential is further compounded by the fact that these types of 
assets are not financed over a year, but rather over a period of up 
to thirty or even forty years.49  This lower cost of financing is a 
major reason why the government typically spearheads large public 
infrastructure projects. 
Traditionally, part of the logic behind exempting government 
bonds from taxes is that the benefit of a lower cost to build and 
maintain the asset is passed along to the public in the form of lower 
fees for service, or a higher operating margin for the entity.  Where 
allowed, this higher operating margin is often be used to 
 
 47. Id. at 30–32. 
 48. Maria Crawford Scott, Munis vs. Taxables: How to Determine the 
Taxable Equivalent Yield, AM. ASS’N OF INDIVIDUAL INV’RS. J. (2009), 
https://www.aaii.com/journal/article/munis-vs-taxables-how-to-determine-the-
taxable-equivalent-yield [https://perma.cc/ALK7-2E8Q]; O’HARA, supra note 
46, at 1–2.  The cost of borrowing is lowered even further by the ability to solicit 
lenders ranging from individuals investing their retirement income, to 
sophisticated institutional investors, through competitive sales of their bonds 
into this $2.9 trillion dollar capital marketplace.  See generally id.  
 49. See O’HARA, supra note 46, at 25. 
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supplement other municipal revenue sources—i.e., taxes.50  For an 
asset transferred to a pension fund, the ability to borrow and 
operate on a tax-exempt basis provides a major benefit of helping 
to drive a substantially higher rate of return for the fund while 
minimizing the impact on the ratepayer. 
In addition to the public benefit, the limitation on the power of 
the federal and state governments to tax one another also has a 
legal foundation: the constitutional doctrine of “intergovernmental 
tax immunity,” rooted in the United State Supreme Court’s decision 
in McCullough v. Maryland.51  Subsequently, there have been 
numerous efforts by Congress to curtail the tax-exempt benefit of 
municipal borrowings; however, state and local government bonds 
largely remain exempt from federal, and often state, taxation.52  As 
such, interest payments made to state and local governments’ 
lenders are tax-free income.53 
However, the government aggressively curtails the use of tax-
exempt bonds through the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) under 
the Internal Revenue Code (IRC).54  Section 115 of the IRC allows 
the IRS to determine if the income of government operations is tax 
exempt.55  When a municipality owns and finances a public asset 
that provides a public function, the determination of its taxability 
is clear; however, debt that is not directly issued by a state or local 
government entity, or a designated 501(c)3 organization, with very 
few exceptions, is not tax exempt.56 
One of those exemptions is for an “instrumentality” of 
government.  An instrumentality of government is an entity used 
to provide a traditional public function, but which may not 
technically fall under the definition of a state or a political 
subdivision.57  Examples provided by the IRS include schools, 
 
 50. Julia Kagan, Budget Surplus, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 17, 2018), https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/b/budget-surplus.asp [https://perma.cc/FLT3-
BESF]. 
 51. See generally 17 U.S. 316 (1819). O’HARA, supra note 46, at 226. 
 52. O’HARA, supra note 46, at 29, 229. 
 53. Id. at 30–32. 
 54. Id. at 230. 
 55. I.R.C. § 115. 
 56. See I.R.C. §§ 103, 115. 
 57. WHAT ARE GOVERNMENT ENTITIES AND THEIR FEDERAL TAX 
OBLIGATIONS?, IRS,  https://www.irs.gov/government-entities/federal-state-
local-governments/government-entities-and-their-federal-tax-obligations 
[https://perma.cc/L7YX-PDMC] (last updated June 28, 2018) [hereinafter 
GOVERNMENT ENTITIES]. 
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libraries, and hospitals.58  The IRS carefully notes that whether or 
not an organization qualifies as an instrumentality of government 
depends on certain facts and circumstances.59  The IRC provides 
almost no guidance on this matter. 
However, a 1957 IRS Revenue Ruling provides a series of 
factors considered by the IRS in making this determination: (1) 
whether the organization is used for a governmental purpose and 
performs a governmental function; (2) whether the performance of 
the organization’s functions is on behalf of one or more states or 
political subdivisions; (3) “whether there are private interests 
involved, or whether the states or political subdivisions involved 
have the powers and interests of an owner”; (4) “whether control or 
supervision of the organization is vested in public authority or 
authorities”; (5) “whether express or implied statutory or other 
authority is necessary” or exists for the creation and/or use of the 
organization; and (6) the organization’s degree of financial 
autonomy and the source of its operating expenses.60 
Given that an entity must serve a public purpose to qualify for 
tax-exempt status, the penumbra resulting from the combination of 
these six public purpose seeking factors commands that the 
composition of an entity’s leadership be directly traceable back, and 
ultimately accountable, to the taxpayer.61  Thus, when determining 
if an asset owned by a pension fund would be eligible for tax-
exemption, the composition of a pension fund’s governing board is 
a decisive factor in determining whether it is an instrumentality of 
government.62  Frequently, the boards overseeing the management 
of pension assets are appointed by both elected officials and entities 
that are not democratically elected, but serve public purposes, 
specifically labor unions and retired pensioners.63  For a municipal 
pension fund to be considered an instrumentality of government a 
majority of a pension fund’s board should be comprised of 
individuals appointed by democratically elected officials, rather 
than non-governmental parties—i.e., labor unions.64 
 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 57–128, 1957–1 C.B. 311). 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See PROVIDENCE, R.I., HOME RULE CHARTER pt. 1, art. IX, § 908 (2006), 
https://library.municode.com/ri/providence/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId
=PTIHORUCH_ARTIXPEDE_908REBO [https://perma.cc/J9UE-3YCA]. 
 64. See Rev. Rul. 57–128, 1957–1 C.B. 311. 
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Rhode Island’s major municipal pension funds are overseen by 
boards predominantly representing the public, likely making them 
instrumentalities of government well situated to maintain public 
oversight and the tax-exempt status of acquired assets. 
IV. RHODE ISLAND PENSIONS ARE INSTRUMENTALITIES OF 
GOVERNMENT 
A. The Legal Structure of the Boards Governing the Management 
of Rhode Island’s Municipal Pension Assets Ideally Situate 
Them to Execute Asset Transfers on a Tax-Exempt Basis 
Rhode Island’s most vulnerable pension funds are well-situated 
to execute Asset Transfers on a tax-exempt basis while maintaining 
public oversight of the assets.  Each municipality has structured 
the governance of pensioners’ assets in a different way, however, all 
are instrumentalities of government; some are controlled by a 
retirement board specifically convened for such purposes, whereas 
others are managed by a city investment board that has the 
responsibility of overseeing a range of city monies.65  The 
composition of these managing boards is the focus of the IRS’s 
determination of whether or not a municipality’s pension fund is an 
instrumentality of government.66  Specifically, the IRS is concerned 
with whether the board is primarily controlled by the government 
directly, through individuals appointed by the democratically 
elected representatives of taxpayers—i.e., city/town council 
members or elected executives like mayors.67 
The City of Cranston’s pension funds are the clearest example 
of what the IRS would consider an instrumentality of government.  
In Cranston, the city’s board of investment commissioners oversees 
municipal employees’ pension assets.68  This seven-member board 
is entirely comprised of individuals that were either democratically 
 
 65. Compare WOONSOCKET, R.I., CITY CHARTER ch. V, art. 1, § 3 (2018), 
http://clerkshq.com//Content/Woonsocket-ri/books/charter/woonch05.htm 
[https://perma.cc/SW65-TTEF], with PAWTUCKET, R.I., CODE ch. 11, art V, § 11-
26 (21996), https://ecode360.com/8128241 [https://perma.cc/437Z-4BH6]. 
 66. See Rev. Rul. 57–128, 1957–1 C.B. 311.   
 67. See id. 
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elected or appointed by the city’s elected officials.69  Notably, those 
responsible for running city government—the mayor, council 
members responsible for the budget, city treasurer, and city finance 
director—make up the majority of the board, and the remaining 
three members are appointed by the city’s democratically-elected 
mayor.70  The ex-officio membership majority, combined with the 
three members appointed by the city’s executive, make it an 
instrumentality primarily controlled by the executive, with 
minimal oversight from the city council and none from labor.71  This 
structure is by far the strongest of those surveyed when 
determining that the pension fund is an instrumentality of 
government.72 
The City of Woonsocket’s investment board membership is 
similarly well-situated to execute an Asset Transfer without tax 
complications or ceding public oversight.  The pension assets of the 
city’s retirees are managed by a city appointed investment board.73  
The five-member board is appointed by the city’s elected council per 
the city’s charter.74  Even though the city’s chief executive (the 
mayor) has less control over this membership structure, it is 
selected entirely by elected city officials, and the IRS is likely to 
view the board as an instrumentality of government as it is clearly 
convened to serve the city.75 
While also well situated to be an instrumentality of 
government, the Town of Johnston’s Retirement Board gives some 
control to non-democratically elected parties: two of its seven 
members appointed by public employee labor unions.76  The Town’s 
two labor appointed members are selected by the bargaining units 
themselves: the International Brotherhood of Police Officers, Local 
307, and the International Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO 
1950, each select one of their members to serve on the Retirement 
 
 69. See CRANSTON, R.I., CHARTER ch. 7, § 7.05(b) (2018), https://library.
municode.com/ri/cranston/codes/code_of_ordinances?nodeId=CH_CH7DEFI_S
7.05PODUTR [https://perma.cc/LA77-FWPF]. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See Rev. Rul. 57-128, 1957-1 C.B. 311.   
 73. See WOONSOCKET, R.I., CITY CHARTER ch. V, art. 2, § 3 (2002), 
http://clerkshq.com//Content/Woonsocket-ri/books/charter/woonch05.htm#_
CPA8 [https://perma.cc/L8YA-B94E]. 
 74. Id. 
 75. See Rev. Rul. 57-128, 1957-1 C.B. 311. 
 76. See JOHNSTON, R.I., CODE pt. 1, ch. 47, §§ 47-39(2)–(3) (2018), 
https://ecode360.com/16068236 [https://perma.cc/5ESS-L5HY]. 
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Board.77  Despite these two appointees, the clear majority of the 
Retirement Board membership is appointed by Town officials, 
leaving it largely under the Town’s control and therefore likely to 
be considered an instrumentality of government by the IRS.78 
The City of Pawtucket’s pension board contains a more 
substantial mix of labor appointed members and city appointed 
members.79  Specifically, four of the nine members are appointed 
by their respective labor groups: two firefighters are elected and 
confirmed to serve by current and retired firefighters, as are two 
police officers from and by their respective current and retired 
members.  Because the balance of the membership (five members) 
is appointed by the mayor or council, the body continues to be 
primarily government controlled, and should still be considered an 
instrumentality of government.80 
The City of Warwick’s city controlled pension funds are 
invested by its municipal retirement board.81  Similar to Pawtucket 
and Johnston, this eleven member retirement board handles the 
investment of pension assets and is comprised of a mix of 
government and labor appointees, with four selected by the 
pensioners rather than elected officials.82  Of these four appointees, 
the president of the municipal employees bargaining unit serves as 
one, and the remaining three are elected from and by the city’s 
retirees and current employees in accordance with specific 
parameters.83  The overwhelming majority of board members, 
however, are appointed by the city’s democratically elected mayor 
(as either members of the public or his administration) and the city 
council.84  This structure situates the city’s pension funds as 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. §§ 47-39(1), (4)–(5). 
 79. See PAWTUCKET, R.I., CODE ch. 11, art. V, § 11–26 (1996), 
https://ecode360.com/8128241 [https://perma.cc/R4EK-3F3M]. 
 80. See Rev. Rul. 57-128, 1957-1 C.B. 311.  The presence of labor 
appointees can be problematic in regard to the ruling, which states that a 
determining factor regarding whether an entity is an instrumentality of 
government can depend on “[w]hether control and supervision of the 
organization is vested in public authority or authorities.”  Id. 




 82. Id. ch. 6, art. IX, div. 1, § 6-242. 
 83. Id. § 6-242(6).   
 84. Id. §§ 6-242(1)–(5). 
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government controlled, likely making it an instrumentality of 
government.85 
In contrast to the other surveyed municipalities, the 
composition of the City of Providence’s retirement board is on the 
line of maintaining public control, with half of its twelve members 
appointed by labor.86  As a home rule municipality, the Retirement 
Board’s membership composition is defined under Providence’s 
Home Rule Charter, which includes specific parameters and 
processes for the selection of both government and labor 
members.87  The mechanics include a combination of appointment 
and election, but the end result is the same: half of the members 
are appointed or elected by democratically-elected municipal 
officials, and the other half are elected by labor groups consisting of 
past and present city employees.88  The city can make a strong 
argument that, because the management of the actual investment 
duties is handled within City Hall rather than through an outside 
entity, the pension fund remains an instrumentality of government. 
CONCLUSION 
The next recession threatens to push many of Rhode Island’s 
cities and towns to the brink of insolvency, and Rhode Island 
municipalities should consider Asset Transfers as one of the tools 
available to position their pension funds to negotiate meaningful 
reforms to reach healthy funding levels.  Municipal insolvency 
threatens both the basic services relied upon to sustain the state’s 
economic core, and the pensions owed to hard working public 
employees.89  Bankruptcy and privatization are not the only 
answers.  Public assets should remain under public control and can 
if transferred to public pension funds.  While additional matters 
need to be explored—ranging from the mechanics of deriving cash 
from a contributed asset to the optimal management structure—it 
is clear that under the current tax regime, Rhode Island 
municipalities should seriously consider pursuing Asset Transfers 
 
 85. See Rev. Rul. 57-128, 1957-1 C.B. 311. 




 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See Russ, supra note 8.   
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as a tool to improve the funding of their respective municipal 
pensions.  If government must account for its liabilities like the 
private sector, it should consider doing the same in how it accounts 
for its assets, by using Asset Transfers.  It’s time Rhode Island’s 
municipalities rebalance their balance sheets. 
 
